Policy Research Working Papers. types of rent-seeking? To address the relationship between concessional assistance, corruption, and other types of rent-seeking activities, the author provides a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model. Insights with interesting implications emerge from the analysis: - An increase in government revenue (from windfalls, for example, or from increased foreign.
Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers. The concept of rent seeking was introduced to the economics profession by Tullock (1967). In his original presentation the basic.
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1880 Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking Whyhasforeignaidhadso seemingly poor a macroeconomic impact in Jakob Svensson many developing countries? Is there a relationship between concessional assistance; widespread corruption, and other types of rent-seeking? The World Bank Development Economics Research Group February 1998.
We recast the conventional rent-seeking model to consider how alternative evidence standards affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different evidence standards, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures and the selection of cases brought to the courts. The.
Rent-seeking is the activity of generating and allocating transfers between economic actors. It results in waste and inequality. The rise of rent-seeking, with its epicentre in the accountancy, legal and banking professions, has been seriously damaging.
Rent seeking has once again become an important topic in economics. However, rent seeking poses challenges that standard economic theory is not well equipped to handle. This paper develops a.
Rent-seeking is an attempt to obtain economic rent (i.e., the portion of income paid to a factor of production in excess of what is needed to keep it employed in its current use) by manipulating the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, rather than by creating new wealth. Rent-seeking implies extraction of.
Rent-seeking has been an important concept in economics since the 1950s but has not been sufficiently mined in the field of social policy. This paper aims to address this by employing a UK case study to illustrate the relevance of rent-seeking in this context. In doing so it attempts to set out a means of identifying where rents are sought, by whom and the levers they use to extract them.
Future Rent-Seeking and Current Public Savings Ricardo J. Caballero, Pierre Yared. NBER Working Paper No. 14417 Issued in October 2008 NBER Program(s):Public Economics The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits.
Tullock, Gordon, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, Western Economic Journal, 5:3 (1967:June) p.224.
In one research paper, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explicitly use pre-law college majors as a proxy for the presence of rent-seeking behavior. As another example, the health care sector is one of the few that has actually outpaced finance in terms of claiming an ever-larger share of overall economic activity, yet much analysis finds not only that a large fraction of provided (and billed.
Biography. Professor Mushtaq Khan is a Professor of Economics at SOAS University of London, and Executive Director of the DFID-funded Anti-Corruption Evidence Research Consortium.He is a leading thinker on anti-corruption, governance, economic development and political settlements, with research interests that include industrial policy, institutional economics, political economy, the economics.
Rent seeking takes the form of the rich and powerful people redistributing wealth upwards. The policies in place allow the powerful people, aided by the political system, to get wealth from the poor, and add to the wealth of the rich. The powerful people in the financial sector prey on the poor, uninformed people through dubious lending and credit card practices. The financial power houses.
Varieties of Corruption: The Organization of Rent-Seeking in India Authors. Jennifer Bussell, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; History. Goldman School of Public Policy Working Paper (April 2013) Abstract. How is corruption organized? Studies of corrupt behavior to date shed light on both the causes and consequences of corruption. Yet we have little.
A popular example for rent-seeking is political lobbying by companies. These are primarily done by companies in order to make economic gains through government action. This might be done by a company to get subsidy from the government for the product which it produces or increasing tariff rates by the government for its services, etc. Such a.
This paper focuses on a specific subset of this research—theoretical and empirical research that brings to bear the idea of rent-seeking to explain the resource curse phenomenon. The idea of rent-seeking has a long history in economics, dating back to the seminal work of Tullock (1967). Although originally developed to explain the social.
IMF Working Paper IMF Institute Rent Seeking Prepared by Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris1 Authorized for distribution by Eric V. Clifton March 2005 Abstract This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent.
Engineering Research. Applied Mechanics and Materials Advances in Science and Technology International Journal of Engineering Research in Africa Advanced Engineering Forum Journal of Biomimetics, Biomaterials and Biomedical Engineering.
Journal of Nano Research Defect and Diffusion Forum Solid State Phenomena. Home Rent Seeking. Papers by Keyword: Rent Seeking. Paper Title Page. Compensation Incentive of CEO and Internal Capital Market Allocation Efficiency. Authors: Xue Wei Zhang, Liang Hua Chen Abstract: In the agency theory of internal capital market, the compensation incentive of Headquarters is discussed as a key.